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Abstract 
Gross job and worker flows in Russian industry are studied using panel data from a recent survey 
of 530 firms selected through national probability sampling.  The data permit an examination of 
several important measurement issues – including the timing and definition of employment, the 
roles of split-ups and mergers, and the relative magnitudes of rehiring and new hiring and of quits 
and layoffs – and they contain a rich set of firm characteristics that may affect job and worker 
turnover.  The results imply that job destruction and worker separation rates in industrial firms 
rose in the early 1990s, as did job flows as a fraction of worker flows and layoffs as a fraction of 
separations.  By contrast, job creation and worker hiring rates were flat until 1999, the former low 
and the latter surprisingly high.  Heterogeneity in individual firm behavior increased throughout.  
New firms and old enterprises that have been reorganized display much larger flows compared 
with unreorganized enterprises.  Unions appear to reduce worker flows, but the structure of 
neither product nor labor markets shows a significant impact.  Private ownership has ambiguous 
effects:  insider ownership, particularly by managers, is associated with higher worker flows and 
excess job reallocation, while outsider ownership, particularly by blockholders, is associated with 
lower flow rates.  A measure of adjustment costs constructed from the worktime necessary to hire 
and train a new employee is strongly related to variables usually associated with adjustment 
costs, including worker wage, education, firm size, capital intensity, and labor productivity, but 
only weakly to job and worker turnover.  Little evidence is found that firms’ employment 
adjustments have become more sensitive to adjustment costs during the transition, but worker and 
manager ownership are associated with more sensitivity than are other types of ownership. 
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Introduction 
Dynamic labor markets – the continual shifting of jobs and workers across firms and 
sectors of the economy – are characteristic of well-functioning market economies, and they are 
vital in the post-socialist transition.  Recent research on the US and other developed countries has 
emphasized the large rates of job and worker flows, suggesting continual reallocation in labor 
markets (see, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992 and 1999; Anderson and Meyer, 1994; Burgess, 
Lane, and Stevens, 2000 and 2001).  The importance of such flows in the transition economies is 
heightened by the Soviet inheritance of misallocation and poorly functioning institutions, 
suggesting both that massive labor reallocation is required and that the process faces substantial 
barriers. 
How effectively has the Russian labor market facilitated this labor reallocation process?  
Some scholars would answer that it has worked like a "neoclassical economist's dream" (Layard 
and Richter, 1994).  In addition to the much faster fall in real wages compared with employment, 
one of the pieces of evidence adduced for this view is the high worker flows reported in official 
State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat) data, which has been interpreted as suggesting that 
rapid labor reallocation is underway.  Undermining this interpretation is the fact that worker 
flows were already high in the 1980s, which was presumably not a period of rapid reallocation.  
There are some indications, moreover, that the worker flows are not associated with high job or 
inter-sectoral flows, which are more commonly identified with restructuring (Clarke, 1999; 
Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 1997, 2001; Kapeliushnikov, 1997a, 1997b, 2001).  On the other hand, 
studies using micro data on firms suggest that job flows have risen substantially since the 1980s 
(Brown and Earle, 2002), and that adjustment speeds and wage elasticities of labor demand are 
not abnormally low (Aukutsionek, Filatototchev, and Kapeliushnikov, 2000; Shakhnovich and 
Yudashkina, 2001; Konings and Lehmann, 2002).  Moreover, studies of individual data find that 
worker mobility has increased, as job tenure has fallen (Lehmann and Wadsworth, 1999), 
occupation-switching has increased (Sabirianova, 2002), and the rates of job mobility, hirings, 
and separations have all jumped – in ways that appear to reflect patterns of large-scale structural 
change (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). 
This paper contributes to this still small, but growing literature on Russian labor market 
flexibility by analyzing new survey data with annual information on both job and worker flows 
for the period 1990-1999.  The basic database was constructed from a survey of 530 industrial 
firms, selected through national probability sampling in 32 Russian oblasts, with a probability 
proportional to employment size.  The data permit us to estimate annual rates of both job flows 
and worker flows for a consistent set of firms, to relate these flows to detailed information on 
firm characteristics, and to address a number of measurement issues that have arisen in 
discussions of job and worker flows, but which have remained unresolved.  For instance, we are 
able to compare the magnitude of job flows measured by the change in employment from 
beginning to the end of the year (the standard in U.S. studies, for instance of Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1992 and 1999) with the magnitude obtained when the change in the annual average 
level of employment is used instead (as in studies of administrative data in Russia, for instance 
by Acquisti and Lehmann, 2000; or Brown and Earle, 2002), and we can compare the job flow 
rates implied by the survey data with those from the administrative reporting, both calculated by 
the same methodology.  The data also allow us to measure employment changes associated with 
changes in firm boundaries (such as split-ups, spin-offs, mergers, and acquisitions) and to 
measure some types of flows that are less commonly studied:  rehiring of former employees, and 
the division of total separations between quits and layoffs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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When the analysis focuses on job flows, a disadvantage of our survey data is a smaller 
number of observations than in administrative reports.  Not only is the sample size smaller, but 
questions of representativeness also arise:  although the firms in our database constitute a 
probability sample, there are issues of both stratification and nonresponse.  These potential 
problems do not seem, however, to have created substantial deviations in our sample from the 
officially reported composition of Russian industry by industry, region, and size.  Moreover, the 
aggregate job flows and worker flows implied by our data correspond rather closely with the 
published tabulations of Goskomstat and previous researchers, as we discuss below. 
In addition to permitting measurement of detailed worker flows and capturing a rich set of 
firm-level determinants of both job and worker flows, our survey data have other advantages over 
registry and tax data.  The latter, it should be remembered, are themselves frequently neither 
universal nor representative due to systematic exclusion of some categories, inconsistent 
inclusion of others, and missing values in some or all economic variables for those included.  One 
important omission from the registries analyzed in an earlier job flow study by Brown and Earle 
(2002), for instance, concerns small firms and new private startups.  Our survey data, on the other 
hand, include such firms on a representative basis.  Survey data also do not suffer from the 
problems with longitudinal linkages that usually beset registry and tax data.
1  Even when the 
identification codes in such data are not changing arbitrarily (and they usually are in such data), 
the meaning of job and worker flow data can be contaminated by spin-offs and other changes in 
firm boundaries.  Our survey data contain information on these events and we can adjust our 
measures of labor flows to take them into account. 
In this paper, our first use of these data is to compute a number of alternative measures of 
the magnitudes of job and worker flows, considering all of these measurement issues.  For each 
type of job and worker flow, we document the evolution in the magnitude and the heterogeneity 
of these reallocation measures.  In broad terms and where comparable, our survey data results 
largely corroborate the findings of other researchers using other administrative and survey data 
sets (see especially Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001; Kapeliushnikov, 2001; Brown and Earle, 
2002). 
The paper then investigates a number of possible determinants of labor flows, again 
exploiting the survey data's inclusion of some measures that are usually unavailable.  In the 
Western literature on job flows, attention has focused on firm age, product market competition, 
and a set of firm characteristics usually motivated by their presumed association with adjustment 
costs:  size, average wage, labor productivity, and capital and energy intensity.  Each of these 
factors takes on added meaning and requires special attention to measurement issues in the 
transition context. 
With respect to firm age, the question of how job and worker flows evolve over the firm's 
lifecycle acquires particular importance due to the critical role played by new private firms in 
economic transition.
2  Our survey questionnaire contained detailed questions on the origins and 
evolution of firms, information that we exploit in distinguishing genuinely new private entities 
from spin-offs and other reorganized parts of the inherited set of state assets.  We analyze the 
                                                 
1 See Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1998) for discussions of these measurement 
issues. 
2 For research on the U.S., see Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989a and 1989b) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1992 
and 1999).  In the transition context, Kornai (1990), Murrell (1992), and others have argued that the development of 
the new private sector is critical to growth. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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employment behavior of these groups of firms compared with that of the former socialist 
enterprises. 
Firm characteristics that reflect governance and decision-making of managers are 
especially interesting in the transition context, due to the inheritance of central planning, soft 
budget constraints, and resource misallocation.  Product market competition, for instance, could 
not play much of a role before liberalization policies opened up price-setting, market entry, 
advertising and other instruments of competition.  To approach this issue empirically, we draw on 
previous work, measuring product market concentration from the Goskomstat industrial registry, 
which contains the universe of large and medium-size industrial firms in Russia, and adjusting 
this measure for the geographic dispersion of production (Brown and Earle, 2001).  We also 
consider another type of market pressure, namely from the local labor market.  In addition to the 
possibility that operating in a concentrated labor market may provide firms with rents that 
cushion their adjustments, analogously to the product market, labor flows may also be influenced 
by the extent to which workers have outside options.  For this purpose, we construct measures of 
local labor market competition, again drawing on the industrial registry data.  A related factor, 
one that is particularly important to consider in the transition context, is corporate governance, 
with the main policy levers being privatization and institutional development.  In Russia, the 
privatization program resulted in high levels of worker and manager ownership, as well as some 
outsider and continued state ownership.  Our data contain detailed information on the 
privatization process and ownership outcomes that permit us to construct precise measures of the 
ownership structure and its evolution.  An additional factor seldom available in other studies is 
the extent of union membership, which we exploit together with the other governance and 
competition factors in our empirical analysis. 
Finally, the role of adjustment costs also acquires special interest, first, due to the 
likelihood that these were comparatively uninfluential on behavior during the Soviet period, as 
planners and managers strove to achieve output goals and job flows were much lower (as shown 
by Brown and Earle, 2002), and second, because of the large magnitude of restructuring required.  
For this purpose, we employ our own measure of one-time hiring and training costs, derived from 
direct questions on our firm survey.  Our measure is strongly correlated with a number of 
variables – including size, average wage, labor productivity, capital intensity, and workers' 
education – that are often considered to be associated with adjustment costs and sometimes used 
as proxies for them. 
We investigate the relationship of these factors with several measures of job and worker 
flows:  job reallocation, excess job reallocation, worker turnover, and excess worker churning 
(one minus the fraction of all worker turnover accounted for by job reallocation).  In reporting the 
results, regression methods are useful to provide compact presentations of results, to control for 
other firm characteristics and to display the evolution of the relationships over time.  We also 
investigate the hypothesis that the degree to which adjustment costs affect the labor flows may be 
a function of firm age, ownership, market competition, and unionization, thus including 
interaction terms for these variables in our regressions. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes our data and measurement 
procedures, including the empirical strategy for distinguishing true time effects from spurious 
differences associated with sample changes in the survey data and for computing the effects of 
covariates on excess job reallocation.  Section 3 contains the basic results for the magnitudes and 
heterogeneity of worker and job flows over the 1990-1999 period.  Section 4 reports the 
relationship between the flows and firm and environmental characteristics including age, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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ownership, unionization, product and labor market concentration, and adjustment costs.  Section 
5 focuses on the effects of firm ownership, unionization, and market competition on the 
responsiveness of firms to adjustment costs.  Section 6 concludes with a summary of the results. 
 
2.   Data and Measurement Procedures 
The survey data that we study in this paper permit us to measure both job flows and 
worker flows, to study some aspects of the flows that have not previously been addressed, and to 
examine the relationship of the flows with detailed covariates that may be potential determinants 
of labor market behavior.  The quality of the data is dependent on the design of the questionnaire 
and sample and on the implementation of the fieldwork and data entry and cleaning; thus, a short 
discussion of these topics is in order (more detail can be found in Biletsky et al., 2002).  The 
survey questionnaire focused on quantitative questions rather than managerial opinions, and 
financial and employment variables were specified in the standard terminology of Russian 
accounting, making use of the precise line numbers of Goskomstat forms wherever possible; the 
questionnaire was developed over several years and underwent several stages of pilot-testing.
3  
Selection of firms for interviews was based on a national probability sample, as described further 
below.  The survey fieldwork was not contracted out to a single organization, but instead made 
use of a regional network of interviewers, who were trained and monitored by the participating 
researchers themselves.  The data collection relied on several face-to-face interviews with 
company officials (the general director, personnel director, and accountant, in each case specified 
on particular sections of the questionnaire), as well as follow-up interviews in person or over the 
telephone to clarify ambiguities and inconsistencies.  The information on the questionnaires was 
double-entered, and assiduously checked and cleaned.  Finally, the survey data were linked to 
other data sources (Goskomstat Industrial Registries and Balance Sheets) to supplement and 
further check the provided information.
4 
In analyzing these data to quantify annual rates of job creation, destruction, reallocation, 
and excess reallocation, we follow the methodology developed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992 
and 1999), in particular identifying job creation with employment increases and job destruction 
with employment declines at a business unit.  Unlike most research on job flows, our survey data 
are able to distinguish employment changes due to changes in firm boundaries (such as split-ups, 
spin-offs, mergers, and acquisitions) and other employment changes associated with a constant 
entity.  A detailed history of such boundary changes was included on the questionnaire, and we 
use this information to adjust most of the flows that we analyze. The survey data also contain 
measures of employment at the end of each year (the point-in-time measure, as in Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1992 and 1999) as well as an annual average (the measure available in most 
administrative data sets, used for instance by Acquisti and Lehmann, 2000; and Brown and Earle, 
2002), and we examine whether these alternative measures have different implications for the 
observed job flow behavior. 
The concepts of hiring and separations in this paper are also standard, similar for example 
to those used by Anderson and Meyer (1994), Hamermesh, Hassink, and van Ours (1996), and 
                                                 
3 The designs of the Goskomstat forms were occasionally changed during this period, thus for each variable the 
survey questionnaire specified the appropriate line number on the form for each year in which the information was 
requested. 
4 The survey data do not capture exit and there is little entry in this sector, so our analysis is restricted to continuing 
firms.  In related work, Kapeliushnikov (1997a, p. 35) suggests that this omission likely leads to a proportionately 
greater understatement of job creation than of job destruction.  The behavior of continuing new private firms 
(started-up after 1986 with no predecessors prior to that year) is studied below, however. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2000 and 2001), and they have been applied in Russia by 
Kapeliushnikov (1997a and 2001).
5  In addition, our data permit us to distinguish rehiring of 
former employees from new hires and voluntary quits from layoffs.  Data on rehiring are not 
collected by the Goskomstat, nor have they been systematically collected in other nationwide 
surveys of Russian worker flows.
6  The U.S. turnover statistics (see, e.g., Bureau of Labor 
Statistics [BLS], 1979) include a category of "recalls," which differ from our definition by 
involving the employer taking the initiative to recall the former employee and by requiring a 
separation of at least seven consecutive days; our definition places neither of these constraints.  
Concerning types of separations, the definition of voluntary quits in our questionnaire follows the 
Goskomstat's, including all of the following categories of separations:  appointment to a 
competitively-filled position, move to another region, transfer of spouse to another region or 
abroad, illness or disability, acceptance to an educational institution, voluntary retirement, and 
voluntary quit of pregnant women or women with children under age 14.  The survey definition 
of firm-initiated layoffs again follows the Goskomstat, referring to layoffs in connection with a 
reduction in the number of employees.  This definition is more closely linked to the practice in 
household surveys in defining the reason for unemployment than to the distinction between 
employer-initiated separations that are "without prejudice" to the individual employee, and those 
that are not.  The latter category of disciplinary discharges is probably the largest component in 
separations classified as neither quits nor layoffs. 
While our measurement concepts follow the broader literature and standard practices, the 
fact that our data are based on a sample survey rather than a universe, or near-universe, presents 
some challenges when estimating job and worker flow rates, however.
7  First is the difficulty in 
obtaining a representative random sample.  Second, because of missing values and firm age 
differences, the sample changes over time, which could influence the measured trends.  Third, a 
question arises concerning the statistical precision of our survey-based estimates. 
As explained in Biletsky et al. (2002), our interview sample was obtained through 
national probability sampling, based on all industrial employers of the employee-respondents to a 
nationwide household survey, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.  The sampling for 
the latter survey involved very careful regional stratification across 32 Russian oblasts, with the 
probability of selection proportional to population (except for Moscow and St. Petersburg, which 
were taken as self-representing), and with a random selection of addresses for interviewing 
within the geographical sampling units.  Thus, conditional on the same regional stratification 
procedure, the firms in our survey sample constitute a national probability sample of industrial 
employers, with selection probability proportional to employment size.  Unlike most surveys of 
firms, our procedure did not permit the replacement of nonresponding firms with other 
                                                 
5 The definition of the business unit in these papers is the firm, while Davis and Haltiwanger's (1992, 1999) unit is 
the establishment.  Our data, like practically all administrative and survey data in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union of which we are aware, pertain to legal entities.  Some anecdotal evidence suggests that multi-
establishment firms are less common in the transition economies than in the U.S., so that the effect of this difference 
in type of data may not be large, but it is nevertheless a caveat in making comparisons across studies. 
6 Kabalina (1998) presents case studies of 16 enterprises in four Russian regions, and Yakubovich (2002) analyzes 
data on 90 organizations in the city of Samara. 
7 Studies of worker flows seldom use universal data.  Anderson and Meyer (1994) study eight states with data in 
which small firms are under-represented, Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2000, 2001) study data on firms with five or 
more employees in the state of Maryland, and Hamermesh, Hassink, and van Ours (1996) analyze sample survey 
data in the Netherlands; on the other hand, all of these studies include firms in the service sector.  The panels in these 
data sets are usually quite short. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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observations, and interviewers therefore worked hard to include every firm on their sample lists.  
As a result of this procedure, the response rate was approximately two-thirds, or 530 firms, which 
is quite large for a firm survey.  The regional and sectoral shares match those in the official 
statistics reasonably well, as shown in Biletsky et al. (2002).  Response rates did not differ 
between firms included in the Goskomstat Industrial Registry and smaller firms that were not 
included, so there appears to be no problem with size-related bias either. 
We address the issues of changing sample over time and statistical precision of the 
estimation by using regression analysis to calculate the flow rates.  The dependent variables in 
these regressions are as follows.  Job creation is the net employment change for growing firms 
and zero otherwise.  Job destruction is the absolute value of the net employment change for 
contracting firms and zero otherwise.  Job reallocation is the absolute value of net employment 
change.  Excess job reallocation is twice the lesser (in absolute value) of job creation or job 
destruction.  All of these job flows are converted into rates by dividing by average employment 
over the year (usually computed as the mean of beginning and end of year employment levels
8).  
The accession (separation) rate is the sum of accessions (separations) divided by the average of 
beginning- and end-year employment.  The worker flow rate is the sum of the accession and 
separation rates.  The excess worker churning (hereafter, churning) rate is the firm’s worker flow 
rate minus the absolute value of its net employment change.  
To control for sample changes over time, firm fixed effects are included in the 
regressions, as are year dummies.  The rate for a particular year is simply the coefficient on the 
year dummy, while the standard error indicates the precision of the estimate.  The regressions are 
unweighted, because of the nature of our probability sampling (proportional to employment size).  
To control for changes in firm boundaries associated with expansions (mergers and acquisitions) 
or contractions (split-ups and spin-offs), we include a dummy for each of these types of changes.  
The detailed accounting for such reorganizations in our survey data is a significant advantage 
over administrative and most other sources, where information on these changes is usually 
unavailable. 
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), and in order to present the results more 
compactly, examine the robustness of the relationships when controlling for other factors, and 
assess the statistical significance of our findings, we report regressions where the absolute value 
of employment growth (job reallocation) is the dependent variable and firm characteristics are 
included as independent variables.  We also estimate such regressions with worker flows and 
churning as dependent variables.  A special procedure is necessary to handle the nonlinearity in 
excess job reallocation, in which case we calculate coefficients from simulations of the impact of 
a change in each independent variable on the predicted excess reallocation rate, where all other 
variables are permitted to take their true values.
9  For ownership, unionization, and age (new 
versus old), we present calculations for the change in the independent variable of interest from 0 
to 1, while for product and labor market concentration and adjustment cost, we present results for 
a one standard deviation change around the mean.
10 
                                                 
8 This method of scaling is consistent with Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999).  When we investigate the alternative 
measure of job flows based on average-year employment at the beginning of Section 3, below, we scale the flows by 
the average of employment across the two years. 
9 This procedure differs from that followed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), who condition their estimation on the 
median values of all other variables. 
10 We adopted these particular specifications merely for convenience in interpreting the results:  the ownership and 
unionization variables frequently take on a value of zero or one, and the age variables are dummies, while product 
and labor market concentration and adjustment cost are continuous variables and they are never zero.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Taking the example of firm age, predicted excess reallocation for new firms (NF) is 
estimated using equation (1), where  iNF e ˆ  is predicted excess reallocation for new firms,  iNF r ˆ  is 
predicted reallocation, α  is a constant,  NF β  is the coefficient for new firms, γ  is a vector of 
coefficients on the other independent variables,  i X  is a matrix of firm i’s true values for the 
other independent variables, and  iNF g ˆ  is predicted employment growth: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i NF iNF i NF iNF iNF X g abs X r e γ β α γ β α + + − + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ                (1) 
Then, using analogous notation (with old firms labelled OF), we estimate predicted excess 
reallocation for old firms as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i iOF i iOF iOF X g abs X r e γ α γ α + − + = ˆ ˆ ˆ                        (2) 
The only difference in equation (2) compared with equation (1) is that  NF β , the coefficient on the 
new firm dummy,  drops out of the old firm equation.  The excess reallocation coefficient 
associated with NF may then be calculated as the difference of the mean predicted excess 
reallocation between across all n firms: 
()
n
e e
NF
e
N
i
iOF iNF ∑
=
−
=
∂
∂ 1
ˆ ˆ
                                         (3) 
which represents the marginal effect of being a new firm on excess job reallocation. 
 
3. Job and Worker Flow Rates 
The analysis starts by considering three basic measurement issues in analyzing job flows.  
The first concerns the temporal measure of employment.  Studies of job flows in the U.S. 
economy have typically used data on "point-in-time" measures of employment, with annual 
employment growth computed from the difference between employment at the end of one year 
and employment at the end of the previous year (for instance, Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992 and 
1999).  Administrative reporting in Russia and many other transition economies, however, 
typically includes only the annual average level of employment (in the data used for instance by 
Acquisti and Lehmann, 2000; and Brown and Earle, 2002).  Does this make a difference for the 
magnitudes of measured job flows?  Our survey data include employment measured at the end of 
the year as well as the annual average, so we may compare the results. 
The second issue concerns the magnitudes of employment changes associated with 
reorganizations of firm boundaries, such as spin-offs and acquisitions.   Most studies of firm-
level employment behavior assume that the observations under study remain roughly constant 
during the observation period, and legal changes involving the ownership of assets are usually 
assumed away.  The construction of the longitudinal research database (LRD) in the U.S. paid 
close attention to such issues, but limitations of data have prevented most other researchers from 
doing so.
11  How large are the employment changes associated with such reorganizations and 
how much of total employment changes do they account for? 
Finally, we examine the relationship between estimates from our survey and those from 
the administrative source, the registry.  The registry data, which were used in Brown and Earle's 
(2002) study of job flows, exclude most firms with fewer than 100 employees, thus they are not 
                                                 
11 Again, the administrative data sets analyzed by Acquisti and Lehmann (2000) and Brown and Earle (2002) do not 
permit the employment implications of boundary changes to be studied.  Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) 
contains a detailed description of such measurement issues in the LRD. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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universal.  But the contribution of small firms to aggregate job flows is likely to be small, in 
which case the registry might provide a good approximation for the aggregate flows, perhaps one 
that is slightly understated if small firms are more volatile. Thus the magnitude of flows in the 
registry provides a useful check on our survey data. 
Starting with the last issue first, a comparison of the survey and registry data can only be 
carried out with respect to job flows computed on the basis of average annual employment (since 
this is the only concept in the registry), and our computations of these flows using the regression 
methodology described in Section 2, above, are reported in the first four columns of Table 1.  In 
fact, with only a few exceptions, the estimates of registry and survey-based job creation and job 
destruction rates tend to be quite close.  The averages across all years, in the bottom row of the 
table, show only slightly higher rates in the survey data compared with the registry.  Given that 
the survey includes smaller firms not included in the registry, the tendency for job flow rates to 
be higher in the survey is consistent with greater volatility of small firms, but the differences 
introduced by their inclusion are only slight. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 contain the analogous calculations of job creation and 
destruction rates using the end-of-year employment data in the survey.  Interestingly, these 
figures tend to be slightly lower than either the registry or survey average-year flow rates, with an 
average of 2.42 for creation and 9.22 for destruction.  The differences with the average-year 
measures in 1998 and 1999 can be explained by the timing of the crisis of late 1998 and the 
recovery in 1999.  The slight magnitude of the differences suggests that the use of average-year 
data in much of the research on job flows in transition economies may not distort the results so 
much as to jeopardize comparisons across countries and data sets.
12  For consistency with the 
standard definitions of job flows and with our analysis of worker flows, however, the rest of the 
analysis uses end-of-year employment as the basis for the calculations. 
The final measurement issue concerns employment changes associated with 
reorganizations that increase employment (mergers and acquisitions) and those that decrease it 
(split-ups and spin-offs).  The last five columns of Table 1 contain the job flow estimates 
adjusted for .  The differences between the adjusted job creation and destruction rates and the 
unadjusted figures are very small, suggesting only a slightly higher creation and slightly lower 
destruction rate.  The fact that all of the measures in Table 1 provide such a consistent picture of 
job flows may provide some reassurance that the potential problems associated with the usual 
firm-level data sets can be neglected, for practical purposes.  On the other hand, while the 
aggregates are quite similar, this might be due to larger differences at the firm-level that are 
mutually cancelling in the aggregate.  Therefore, we present the rest of the job flows analysis in 
this paper with respect to end-of-year employment where the changes have been adjusted for 
reorganizations. 
Regardless of the measure in Table 1, the magnitudes of job creation and destruction are 
largely consistent with the findings of most other researchers using other data sets, for instance 
by Kapeliushnikov (2001) using the Russian Economic Barometer mail survey, and Brown and 
Earle (2002) using the industrial registries.
13  The job creation rate is very low across all years 
                                                 
12 Another difference between these series is that the average-year figures (in both the registry and the survey) 
pertain to "industrial production personnel," excluding employees in the firm's "nonindustrial" divisions, whose 
primarily function is providing fringe benefits to workers.  The end-year figures include both of these categories 
within all "listed" employees.  For both employment definitions, workers on external contracts and multiple job-
holders (usually part-time workers) who are listed at another firm are excluded. 
13 Kapeliushnikov's (2001) estimates of both creation and destruction are slightly smaller than any of those reported 
in Table 1 in the years 1996-1999.  This difference is surprising in light of the fact that his annual estimates are not William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
  9
until 1999, when it increases substantially as industry begins to recover.  Destruction increases 
sharply at the beginning of the transition, remaining high until declining abruptly in in 1999 (in 
the calculations using the end-year measure of employment).  Compared to the behavior of U.S. 
labor markets, the Russian destruction rate is in a similar range, slightly on the high side, but the 
creation rate is low.  Consistent with these patterns, the job reallocation rate increases 
substantially in the early 1990s, and net change is always negative, even in 1999, a year when 
industrial output increases by eight percent (Goskomstat, 2000).   Excess reallocation mirrors the 
creation rate, low until jumping in 1999.
14 
Turning to worker flows, we again begin with a comparison of our survey-based 
estimates of the accession and separation rates with the official Goskomstat statistics derived 
from the reporting of medium and large enterprises.  As shown in the first four columns of Table 
2, the survey figures are very close to the official statistics, again suggesting that the survey does 
a good job in reproducing standard empirical regularities.  Kapeliushnikov's  (1997a, 2001) 
estimates, however, tend to be somewhat lower than those either reported by the Goskomstat or 
calculated from our survey. 
The numbers in Table 2 suggest that despite low job reallocation rates, the labor market 
was quite active even during the Soviet period.  Moving into the transition period, the survey 
confirms the observations of previous researchers (for example, Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 1997, 
2001; Kapeliushnikov, 1997a, 1997b, 2001) of a high and remarkably steady accession rate.  
Even in 1994, when net employment dropped by over ten percent, the accession rate was 19.24 
percent.  Separations show more of a change across time, steadily increasing through 1994, then 
leveling off; they fall little during the 1999 recovery. 
Table 2 also shows total worker flows, churning (worker flows less the absolute value of 
employment change), and the percentage of worker flows accounted for by churning.  Total 
worker flows show an increasing trend over the period – they are nine percentage points higher in 
1999 than in 1990.  The churning rate is quite high and shows little trend over time.  The last 
column shows that job flows account for a substantially larger share of worker flows during the 
transition than previously  While only about 40 percent of separations represent job destruction 
and only about 11 percent of accessions represent job creation, the overall ratio of job flows to all 
worker flows in Russian industry in the middle and late 1990s is about 30-35 percent, which is 
within the general range suggested by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) with respect to the U.S. 
manufacturing sector.  Even larger ratios might be expected in association with the massive 
restructuring in a transition economy, and indeed Konings, Lehmann, and Schaffer (1996) found 
somewhat higher ratios for Poland in 1990 and 1991.  Nevertheless, the rise in the absolute level 
and the relative importance of job flows do suggest increased dynamism of Russian labor markets 
                                                                                                                                                              
based on annual employment differences but rather on six-month flows, the doubling of which should lead to an 
overstatement of the annual flows if employment is at all volatile.  Anderson and Meyer (1994), Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992, 1999), and others have shown that temporal aggregation of job flows is not straightforward.  
Note that neither Kapeliushnikov (2001) nor Brown and Earle (2002) adjust for the changing samples over their 
respective observation periods. 
14 While the job reallocation rates in Table 1 are lower than those for Poland in 1990-1991 reported by Konings, 
Lehmann, and Schaffer (1996), the excess reallocation rates are significantly higher than the Polish rates in all the 
Russian estimates in Table 1 as well as in Kapeliushnikov (2001). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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compared to their behavior under socialism.
15  The ratio declines in 1999, however, a year in 
which much less job destruction and more job-switching occurs. 
One of the explanations sometimes offered for the high Russian accession and churning 
rates is the possibility that workers leave temporarily and then are later rehired, similar to the 
practice of temporary layoffs in the U.S.  Anderson and Meyer (1994), for instance, show that 
temporary separations account for about 20-30 percent of all separations in the eight U.S. states 
in their study.
16  In Russia, however, there has been rather little evidence on the extent of this 
practice.  Kabalina (1998) reports the rates at 15 enterprises, with a median of 10 percent of 
hiring accounted for by rehiring, and Yakubovich (2002) reports that 16.6 percent of new hires 
were rehires in his study of 90 organizations.  To further investigate the possibility, our survey 
asked each firm’s personnel office to estimate the number of workers hired each year who had 
been previous employees of the firm.  Table 3 shows that rehiring rates are negligible in our 
sample, at the mean never reaching more than about 2 percent of employment or 10.5 percent of 
accessions, so the data provide little support for the hypothesis that the accession rates in Russia 
are somehow inflated by substantial temporary separations and rehiring.
17 
The data also permit us to investigate whether the massive downsizing occurred primarily 
through firm-initiated layoffs or attrition.  Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Commander, 
McHale, and Yemtsov, 1995; Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001; Kapeliushnikov, 2001), Table 3 
confirms that voluntary quits are a substantial and quite stable proportion of separations, ranging 
from 60-68 percent during our sample period.
18  Very rare prior to the transition, firm-initiated 
layoffs increase significantly, but they never reach more than 14.7 percent of separations.  Thus, 
downsizing has been accomplished mainly via attrition.  A possible reason for this may be that 
encouraging workers to quit, which avoids severance payments, has been relatively easy for 
Russian firms.  High inflation has facilitated the reduction of real wages.  Managers have also 
taken advantage of the absence of labor contract enforcement by paying wages in-kind and 
delaying payment for substantial periods (Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti, 1999; Earle and 
Sabirianova, 2002b). 
Next we analyze the heterogeneity in these flows.  The large fall in aggregate 
employment could have been accomplished through relatively equal contractions by each firm, or 
instead some firms could have declined a lot while others expanded.  As Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1992, 1999) have documented extensively, in the U.S. economy, a substantial fraction of firms 
contract in expansion periods, and many expand in recessions.  Table 4 provides a first look at 
heterogeneity by displaying the employment growth distribution for our sample.  Heterogeneity 
was quite low during the Soviet period, but it jumped already in 1992, the first year of the market 
reforms, and became increasingly heterogeneous through 1997.  Remarkably, over 20 percent of 
firms were expanding, even in years when aggregate employment declined by ten percent. 
                                                 
15 The results are somewhat at variance with Kapeliushnikov (2001), who reports job and worker flows starting only 
in 1993.  His churning series shows a big drop in 1994 (as does ours, but after an even bigger drop in 1992), and then 
a large rise in 1995 to 0.75, a level similar to Anderson and Meyer (1994, p. 224) for the U.S. 
16 This study also shows that temporary separations (unlike permanent separations) tend to be counter-cyclical, thus 
these figures, which were estimated for the time period 1979-1982, may be high for cyclical reasons. 
17 Unpaid administrative leaves are not included in this analysis, nor are such leaves included in the Goskomstat data 
on worker flows, as in these cases no separation in the employment relationship occurs.  Aside from this legal 
difference, however, unpaid leaves have some similarities to the practice of temporary layoffs in the U.S. when 
workers have some expectation of recall by the former employer. 
18 The definitions of the types of separations are given in Section 2, above. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Another measure of the heterogeneity of flows is the standard deviations of the residuals 
from the regressions used to calculate the flows.  Presented in Table 5 for each year separately, 
these residuals show that the variation in job creation is much smaller than in job destruction.  
Heterogeneity in job creation increases substantially in the later years, especially 1999, however, 
while job destruction heterogeneity remains fairly constant.  Net employment change variation 
follows the same pattern as job creation.  Unlike job creation and destruction, accessions and 
separations are nearly equally heterogeneous.  There is little trend in any of the worker flow 
components until 1999, when accession and churning heterogeneity nearly double. The worker 
flow standard deviations are a much smaller relative to the flow rates than is the case for job 
flows, suggesting greater heterogeneity of job flows.  The gap narrowed in 1999, however, as 
worker flow heterogeneity grew by 73 percent. 
  
4. Labor Flows and Firm Characteristics 
The considerable heterogeneity in job and worker flows across firms motivates questions 
on how the differences are related to various firm and environmental characteristics.  Table 6 
provides summary statistics for a set of variables of interest.  We first analyze our categories of 
firm age, and their relationship to job and worker flows, because these categories are time-
invariant; next we turn to the time-varying factors. 
While the analysis of firm life-cycles and the disproportionate share of labor flows 
accounted for by start-up firms and recent entrants has been a focus of attention in studies of the 
U.S. economy, the role of firm age takes on special importance in transition.  In particular, new 
firms are frequently suggested to be more dynamic than other firms and more likely to be profit-
maximizers (e.g., Kornai, 1990; Murrell, 1992).  How to define "new" is not entirely clear, 
however, given the ambiguities associated with spin-offs and other reorganizations of existing 
assets.  Some previous surveys have simply asked managers directly, but our experience suggests 
that managers perceive this question as ambiguous and subjective.  Our survey questionnaire 
delved more deeply into this issue, eliciting detailed histories of firm origins and reorganizations.  
We use this information to classify firms into three groups: old firms (those in continuous 
existence since before 1986), reorganized firms (those with a predecessor that existed prior to 
1986 having undergone a major reorganization since then), and new firms (those with no 
predecessor existing in 1986).
19   
Because the categorization of firms is time-invariant, firm fixed effects are omitted from 
the regression results presented in Table 7.  These show that job creation, net employment 
change, and excess job reallocation are much higher and destruction much lower in new firms 
than the other two types, and each of these differences is highly statistically significant.  Job 
reallocation is higher in new firms as well, but that difference is significant only at the ten percent 
level.  Though new firms are hiring at a much more rapid rate, they are just as active as the other 
two categories regarding separations.  Total worker flows and churning are higher in new firms, 
but the differences aren’t highly statistically significant. 
Job flows in reorganized firms are somewhat higher than in old firms, but the differences 
are not statistically significant.  All of the worker flows are much higher in reorganized firms, 
                                                 
19 We define a major reorganization as a merger, a split-up, or a case where the firm has been spun off from a parent 
company; in all these situations, the change affects both the assets of the firm and its legal registration.  Not included 
are acquisitions and cases where the firm has sold or spun off some assets, nor are simple changes of legal form, 
name, ownership, or other reasons for reregistration.  Concerning predecessors, managers were asked a series of 
questions about the existence of the current firm, or any parts or predecessors of it, in 1986. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
  12
however, and these differences are highly significant.  In sum, these results suggest that firm 
origin matters, and not only new vs. old firms, the focus of previous studies, but also the 
distinction between those categories and reorganized firms.   
New firms have accounted for a large proportion of job creation in several Eastern 
European transition economies.
20  Table 8 provides evidence on this issue for Russia.  Old firms 
make up nearly two-thirds of industrial employment at the time of the survey (1999-2000) and 
reorganized firms account for about a quarter, while new firms account for only 6.3 percent, 
suggesting that the new sector has not grown nearly as fast as in Eastern European economies.  
As Table 8 shows, however, new firms have created (destroyed) a much higher (lower) 
percentage of jobs relative to their proportion of employment than either old or reorganized 
firms.
21   
The worker flow differences are less stark.  New firms’ share of accessions is higher, 
while their separations share is about the same as their share of employment.  Reorganized firms’ 
shares of both job and worker flows (except job creation) are slightly higher than their share of 
employment, while old firms’ shares are all lower except for destruction.     
Turning to time-varying factors, a variable of considerable interest in transition 
economies is firm ownership.  Interest in ownership issues stems from the importance of 
privatization policy design as a set of policy levers for influencing restructuring, including the 
reallocation of jobs and workers.  Our survey instrument permits us to construct a detailed 
ownership structure time series for each firm, including information on the types and 
concentration of ownership.  Throughout, we examine the voting shareholding of particular types 
of owners, for which we consider some alternative categorizations.  A first is simply state versus 
private ownership.  It is frequently hypothesized that the state may act to preserve employment.  
It may prefer low worker turnover as well if separated workers are a stronger political force than 
workers who are hired.  The standard hypothesis with respect to private owners, by contrast, is 
that they should have be more interested in profitability, placing no weight on employment level 
or turnover per se.  This suggests that private firms may exhibit higher flows on average. 
Concerning different types of private owners, particular attention must be paid to 
employees, as the insiders were big beneficiaries of the Russian privatization process.  Workers 
and managers may behave differently as owners, however.  Workers are presumably interested in 
keeping their jobs, and ownership may give workers additional influence to block employment 
reductions.  Workers may also be more reluctant to leave a job in a firm where they have 
influence in exchange for a job in one where they do not.  Over time, however, the proportion of 
workers who are owners is likely to decline as worker-owners are replaced with workers without 
shares.  Once only a small fraction of workers own shares, it becomes in the worker-owners’ 
interest to reduce employment when consistent with profit maximization, as the newer workers 
without ownership are likely to bear the costs of the reduction, while the longer-tenured worker-
owners benefit.  And the workers without shares will not feel any extra attachment to the firm, so 
a higher proportion of the workforce will have a higher propensity to quit over time.  If this is the 
case, then one would expect flows to be initially at least as low as for state firms, but over time 
average flows should be higher than for state firms.  
Managers are usually assumed to have a preference for managing larger firms, as size 
raises their status.  The effect of increasing managerial ownership is ambiguous – more control 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Jurajda and Terrell (2000) for the Czech Republic, and Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) for Estonia. 
21 Note once again, however, that our sample does not account for exit.  If new firms exit at a higher rate than old 
firms, it is ambiguous whether the total amount of job destruction is higher or lower in new than in old firms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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rights could help managers to achieve their status objective, but higher cash flow rights could 
instead align the manager’s incentives with profit maximization, which may be inconsistent with 
the size goal.  Presumably, managers also prefer to keep their jobs, and in pursuit of that goal 
some of them may try to accumulate shares as an anti-takeover defense.  It is not clear, however, 
how accumulating shares is related to worker turnover.  If the manager can buy more of the 
outgoing worker shares than outsiders, then the manager may prefer high turnover, but otherwise 
not. 
Outside owners are usually assumed to maximize profit.
22  Depending on the 
circumstances in the firm, profit maximization could be associated with either high or low flows.  
Workers may feel less certain about the future direction of the firm when it is outsider-owned, so 
they may be more apt to search for other employment opportunities.  Outsiders may also have a 
desire to replace workers with people of their own choosing.   So compared to the state and 
possibly to insiders, one would expect higher flows on average. 
It may matter whether the outside owners are dispersed individuals or concentrated legal 
entities or foreign investors.  The concentrated groups are more likely to be able to exert control.  
If the outsiders do not exert control, then insid e r s  w i l l  b e  f r e e  t o  p u rsue their employment 
preservation objective, which will not be tempered by their own ownership.  In such a scenario, 
flows may be lower than under insider ownership.  But if the outsider owners are concentrated, 
profit-maximizing objectives should dominate.  Foreign owners could have an additional effect, 
either by scaring off xenophobic workers (increasing turnover), or by retaining more of them 
because workers anticipate that foreign-owned firms will have better prospects. 
Another governance-type variable that may affect labor flows is the trade union density 
(the proportion of the firm's employees who are members).  Unions have been relatively little 
studied in this context, but it seems likely that union objectives could include the level of 
employment, for instance to enhance the power and prestige of union leaders; this effect should 
work to reduce job reallocation.
23  They may also be interested in preserving their members' jobs 
as well, in which case both job reallocation and worker turnover should be lower in firms with 
high proportions of union membership.  Another possibility is that unions' objectives are most 
closely aligned with their senior members, which has been taken to imply that unionized firms' 
adjustments to negative shocks may tend to favor layoffs over wage and hours cuts (Medoff, 
1979).  A final possibility is that Russian trade unions are either insufficiently independent or too 
weak to have an impact on any of the conditions of employment (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001).  
In this case, we would expect to find no relationship between unionization and labor flows.  
A further set of variables that may affect job and worker turnover involves the market 
environment.  Market competition is frequently argued to push firms toward profit maximization.  
We measure both product and labor market competition in our data (as described in Section 2, 
above).  With more competition of either sort, workers will have more outside opportunities (in 
the sector or in the region), putting upward pressure on worker turnover. 
A final variable that we study is adjustment costs, defined as the sum of costs associated 
with the hiring and initial training of an additional employee (we are unable to measure expected 
firing costs).
24  The basic idea here is that if market reforms are working, then firms should take 
                                                 
22 Legal entities may wish to siphon off profits ("tunnelling," in the mot de jour) from the firm of study to their own 
firm, but even then the legal entity should wish to minimize personnel costs.  
23 Pencavel (1991) contains a detailed discussion of the objectives of unions. 
24 Our survey instrument requested information from the personnel office on the length of time spent on hiring and 
training a new production worker of the type most commonly hired by the firm; this variable is intended as a direct William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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adjustment costs into account in their personnel policies.  On the other hand, adjustment costs are 
likely to be positively associated with worker skills, which if general would imply more outside 
opportunities and higher mobility.  But profit-maximizing firms should also take this into account 
in setting wages. 
A priori, one might have doubts about rough estimates of adjustment costs by personnel 
managers.  Thus, before using these estimates we investigate how correlated they are with other 
variables related to adjustment costs.  In Table 9, we regress the adjustment cost estimates on the 
proportion of the workforce in five different worker education categories, industrial sectors, and 
four variables used in other job flows studies as proxies for adjustment costs, namely average 
employment, capital intensity, average wage, and labor productivity.  The coefficients on these 
standard proxy variables are all positive, though only the average employment and capital 
intensity coefficients are statistically significant.  In three of the four regressions, the coefficients 
on the education categories increase monotonically with the level, as would be expected.  The 
adjustment cost measure also varies significantly by sector in ways that are consistent with the 
complexity and specificity of technology.  The results thus provide some support for analyzing 
the relationships of labor flows with the survey adjustment cost measure. 
The regressions underlying the results reported in Tables 10-12 include time effects and 
firm fixed effects in additional to all variables of interest, with the ownership variables in three 
different levels of aggregation.  The results in Table 10 show higher job reallocation, worker 
flows, and churning in firms with a higher private share, but these results are statistically 
insignificant; the calculated effect on excess job reallocation is negative but very small in 
magnitude. 
Unionization (union density, or percentage of employees who are members) is negatively 
associated with each of the flows, however, and the worker flow and churning rate coefficients 
are large and statistically significant.  The smaller coefficient on job reallocation suggests that 
unions put more emphasis on trying to preserve as many of their members’ jobs as possible than 
on trying to maintain a particular employment level.
25  These results are somewhat surprising in 
light of the conventional wisdom, which holds that Russian unions are largely ineffectual (e.g., 
Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001), although they do support Clarke's (1997) contention that unions 
have actively supported employment adjustments. 
Concerning the market structure factors, product market concentration is positively 
related to job reallocation, and it is slightly positively related to excess job reallocation.
26  
Product and labor market concentration exhibit no relationship with worker flows or churning.  
Labor market concentration is slightly negatively associated with excess job flows, consistent 
with the notion that adjustments of employment levels are more sluggish when outside 
opportunities for workers are poorer. 
                                                                                                                                                              
measure of the "quasi-fixed" costs of labor first introduced by Oi (1962), although he used the wage rates for various 
occupational groups as proxies.  Unfortunately, we do not have data on termination, layoff, or recall categories of 
hiring costs; on the tools and materials, unfilled requisitions, and intrawork transfers categories of training costs; nor 
on unemployment compensation.  See the data appendix for a detailed description of the adjustment cost variable. 
25 Unionization could be endogenous, for instance if employees are more likely to become union members when 
employment conditions are less stable.  This would impart an upward bias to the unionization coefficients in the 
employment adjustment equations, but the coefficients in the worker turnover regressions are negative and 
statistically significant, so our qualitative conclusions would be unaffected.  Note also that our inclusion of firm fixed 
effects implies that this argument applies only to deviations from a firm's sample mean. 
26 This could be the result of reverse causality.  Industries downsizing faster are likely to experience a greater 
increase in concentration, since concentration tends to be negatively related to market size. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Disaggregating private ownership, Table 11 shows a stronger tendency toward job 
reallocation, worker flows and churning associated with insider relative to outsider shareholding.  
From 12, it is clear that these effects result from the largest tendency toward adjustment 
associated with managerial ownership, and the smallest tendency with blockholder ownership 
(both domestic and foreign, but especially the latter). 
Table 13 introduces the adjustment cost variable into the equations, dropping firm fixed 
effects, adding industry effects (10 sectors) and age categories and otherwise keeping the other 
variables from the regressions in Table 10.  The results provide little evidence that firms with 
high adjustment costs have engaged in more labor hoarding than other firms.  While the 
coefficients in the worker flow and churning rate regressions are estimated to be negative, they 
are statistically insignificant, while the coefficient in the job reallocation equation is actually 
positive and significant.
27 
The trends over time in the responsiveness of the job and worker turnover variables are 
shown in Table 14.  The trend for job reallocation is zero but that for excess job reallocation is 
actually in a positive direction.  The coefficients for worker flows and churning are becoming 
more negative over time, consistent with increasing sensitivity to adjustment costs, but they are 
not statistically significant. 
 
5.  Firm Characteristics and Sensitivity to Adjustment Costs 
Though the average firm appears to have become only slightly more sensitive to 
adjustment costs, some types of firms may have become more sensitive than others.  To 
investigate this issue, the final empirical exercise in this paper was to add interactions between 
adjustment costs and the other variables of interest.  This is a more clear-cut test profit-
maximizing orientation than the above examination of differences in average flow levels, since 
the optimal turnover level of each firm depends on adjustment costs. 
Table 15 displays the results when using total private share.  Private share and union 
membership are related to higher sensitivity to adjustment costs regarding excess job reallocation, 
worker flows and churning.  The coefficients on the relationships with worker flows and 
churning are insignificant, however.  Product and labor market concentration are related to lower 
sensitivity to adjustment costs for excess job reallocation, as expected, but they are unrelated to 
adjustment cost sensitivity regarding worker flows and churning.  
Insider owners show much more sensitivity to adjustment costs for worker flows and 
churning than the state, while outsiders show much less (see Table 16).  Both private categories 
show more sensitivity regarding excess job reallocation.  
Among insiders, both workers and managers exhibit significant sensitivity to adjustment 
costs regarding excess job reallocation, worker flows and churning, as shown in Table 17.   
Dispersed outsiders show greater sensitivity as well, while domestic and foreign blockholders 
actually show significantly less sensitivity to adjustment costs, with the exception that domestic 
blockholders show greater sensitivity regarding excess job reallocation than the state.  
Table 18 shows that reorganized firms show somewhat greater sensitivity to adjustment 
costs for worker flows and churning, but old firms show greater sensitivity regarding excess job 
reallocation than either new or reorganized firms.   
 
 
                                                 
27 It should be noted that our adjustment cost measure refers to gross costs of adjustment rather than only to net costs.  
Nonetheless, downsizing and increasing employment levels both entail some gross costs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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6.  Conclusion 
This paper documents job and worker flows in Russia throughout the 1990s, using survey 
data from a probability sample of industrial enterprises.  In addition to being generated by a very 
careful collection process, these data have a number of unusual advantages.  First, the data 
contain a number of alternative ways of calculating job flows, including the use of end-year and 
annual average employment figures.  Second, the data permit both job and worker flows to be 
measured using a common sample and methodology.  Third, the data allow estimation of some 
relatively understudied types of flows, including those associated with several types of 
reorganizations of firm boundaries, rehiring versus new hires, and quits and layoffs.  Finally, the 
data include a rich set of covariates that may condition job and worker flows and some of which 
have been the subject of considerable discussion in research on the economics of transition. 
Concerning the alternative ways of calculating job flows, we find that the broad picture is 
little affected by the several adjustments we are able to make to the survey data.  This result 
provides some support for analyses of other data sets in which such adjustments are not been 
possible.  Our survey data are also quite consistent with official statistics and usually with other 
researchers' analyses – where these are comparable. 
The analysis implies that labor flows in the Russian industrial sector have increased in 
magnitude, particularly job destruction and separations.  Job flows as a proportion of worker 
flows increased during most of the period, suggesting that worker turnover was increasingly 
associated with inter-firm restructuring.  Layoffs have risen slightly as a fraction of all 
separations.  Little rehiring has occurred, suggesting that the high churning rate is not due to 
recalls.  The flows associated with reorganization of firm boundaries have been relatively small.  
The heterogeneity of labor flows rose considerably, however, especially for job creation and each 
of the components of worker flows, which may be taken as a sign of movement toward a market 
economy. 
Concerning firm characteristics that may account for some of this heterogeneity, we find 
that new firms account for a much larger share of job creation relative to their share in industry, 
but they still represent a tiny fraction of industrial employment.  Significant differences are found 
in some, but not all, mean flow rates across firm age categories. 
Little evidence is found that firms have become more sensitive to adjustment costs on 
average, but some categories of firms are significantly more sensitive than others.  Managerial 
and dispersed outsider ownership are associated with significantly more worker turnover and 
churning, while concentrated domestic and foreign ownership are associated with lower turnover.  
Worker and managerial ownership are both associated with greater sensitivity to adjustment 
costs, while individual outsider and foreign ownership are associated with less. 
There are few significant results regarding product and labor market competition, but 
they do appear to enhance sensitivity to adjustment costs vis-à-vis excess job reallocation.   
Unionization is associated with significantly lower worker flows and churning, however, 
suggesting that unions were influential on personnel decisions.  This finding is inconsistent with 
the standard view of Russian industrial relations wherein trade unions are dominated by firm 
managers. 
All of these results should be viewed in the context of the existing literature on Russian 
labor markets and in conjunction with some important caveats.  While we find a significant 
increase in most measures of job and worker reallocation, most of the increases are due to higher 
job destruction and worker separations.  This result may be unsurprising in light of the fact that 
our data pertain only to the industrial sector, which primarily comprises old enterprises inherited William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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from the Soviet period and which face grave problems in restructuring, downsizing and 
surviving.   If we had instead been able to study data from the service sector, we might have 
observed quite different phenomena.  While it has been the premise of this paper that industrial 
restructuring through labor reallocation is a subject worthy of special attention, an extension of 
the analysis to growing sectors such as services would be valuable for further research. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Data Appendix 
 
Accession Rate is the number of accessions in a given year as a percentage of the average of 
beginning- and end-year employment. 
 
Adjust is the natural log of the sum of hiring time plus training time for employees of the 
production worker profession most frequently hired by the firm.  Hiring time is the number of 
person-days spent by the firm’s personnel office to arrange advertisements, interview candidates, 
and process paperwork to hire a replacement (excluding the time waiting for candidates to appear 
at the personnel office or waiting time to start the job).  Training time is the average of the 
number of days necessary to train an employee who did not previously do similar work and the 
number of days necessary to train an employee who did previously do similar work.  Training 
time includes formal training (theory and instruction) at the firm and the time spent by the 
instructors to train the worker on the job.  These data are estimates provided by each firm’s 
personnel office. 
 
Average Employment is the log of the average number of employees in production divisions in 
1998. 
 
Average Wage is the log of the ratio of the total wage bill for employees in production divisions 
to the average number of employees in production divisions in 1998.   
 
Capital Intensity is the log of the ratio of average capital stock in millions of rubles to the 
average number of employees in production divisions in 1998.   
 
Churning Rate is the worker flow rate minus the job reallocation rate. 
 
Dispersed Outsider Share is the proportion of voting shares owned by investors not employed 
by the firm with less than a five percent stake as of July 1 of a given year (except for 1999, where 
it is January 1).  See private share below for more details. 
 
Domestic Blockholder Share is the proportion of voting shares owned by domestic investors 
with at least a five percent stake as of July 1 of a given year (except for 1999, where it is January 
1).  See private share below for more details. 
 
Employment is the number of registered employees in industrial production divisions of the 
firm.  It is measured at the beginning and end of each year. 
 
Excess Job Reallocation is the job reallocation rate minus the absolute value of the net 
employment change. 
 
Foreign Blockholder Share is the proportion of voting shares owned by foreign investors with 
at least a five percent stake as of July 1 of a given year (except for 1999, where it is January 1).  
See private share below for more details. 
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Job Creation Rate is the employment gain as a percentage of the average of beginning- and end-
year employment in an expanding firm, and zero otherwise.  Note that in the first four columns of 
Table 1, average-year employment is the basis for the calculations rather than beginning- and 
end-year employment. 
 
Job Destruction Rate is the employment loss as a percentage of the average of beginning- and 
end-year employment in a contracting firm, and zero otherwise.  Note that in the first four 
columns of Table 1, average-year employment is the basis for the calculations rather than 
beginning- and end-year employment. 
 
Job Reallocation Rate is the sum of the job creation and job destruction rates. 
 
Labor Concentration is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of municipal industrial employment 
concentration, calculated using annual Goskomstat industrial registries.  1992 values are used for 
1990 and 1991, since the numbers are unavailable for those years. 
 
Labor Productivity is the log of the ratio of the value of output in millions of rubles divided by 
the average number of employees in production divisions in 1998. 
 
Layoff Rate is the number of firm-initiated separations in a given year as a percentage of the 
average of beginning- and end-year employment.  These are separations where the firm does not 
intend to refill the position, i.e., they are for the purpose of downsizing.  They do not include 
firm-initiated separations for disciplinary reasons. 
 
Manager Share is the proportion of voting shares owned by managers of the firm as of July 1 of 
a given year (except for 1999, where it is January 1).  See private share below for more details. 
 
Net Employment Change is the change in the number of employees divided by average 
employment (the average of beginning- and end-year employment). 
 
New Firm is a firm founded after 1986 without a predecessor existing in 1986. 
 
Old Firm is a firm founded in 1986 or earlier. 
 
Private Share is the proportion of voting shares owned by private individuals or legal entities as 
of July 1 of a given year (except for 1999, where it is January 1).  The survey measured the 
ownership structure for all shares at the firm's founding date (for new firms and those that had 
undergone a major reorganization), July 1, 1994, and January 1, 1999; the nonvoting share 
ownership structure was measured as of the latter two dates.  Date of majority privatization and 
entry dates for most blockholders (entities with at least five percent of the shares) were also 
collected.  For firms privatized prior to July 1, 1994, ownership is assumed to have remained 
constant between the privatization date and July 1, 1994.   For the years between July 1, 1994 and 
the entry of a new blockholder (if any), and between that time and January 1, 1999, the 
ownership structure is calculated through linear interpolations. 
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Product Concentration is product market concentration, calculated as the regional Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index multiplied by region share plus the national Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
multiplied by one minus region share, where region share is the proportion of regions (oblasts) 
with at least one enterprise in the five-digit OKONKh industry in that year.  This index was 
calculated for each year using annual Goskomstat industrial registries.   
 
Quit Rate is the number of voluntary separations in a given year as a percentage of the average 
of beginning- and end-year employment. 
 
Rehiring Rate is the number of accessions in a given year of persons who were former 
employees of the firm as a percentage of the average of beginning- and end-year employment. 
 
Reorganized Firm is a firm founded after 1986 with a predecessor existing in 1986.  The firm 
underwent a major reorganization requiring it to reregister (i.e., a split-up, spin-off, or a merger). 
  
Separation Rate is the number of separations in a given year as a percentage of the average of 
beginning- and end-year employment. 
 
Union is the proportion of employees who are a member of a trade union at the end of the year.  
This was measured in 1990, 1994, and 1998.  A linear interpolation was performed in the 
intervening years. The 1999 proportion is assumed to be the same as in 1998. 
 
Worker Flow Rate is the sum of the accession and separation rates. 
 
Worker Share is the proportion of voting shares owned by non-managerial employees of the 
firm as of July 1 of a given year (except for 1999, where it is January 1).  See private share above 
for more details. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
  21
 
 
References 
 
Acquisti, Alessandro, and Harmut Lehmann.  2000.  "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the 
Russian Federation." Trinity Economic Paper 2000/1. Dublin: Trinity College Dublin, 
Dept. of Economics. 
 
Anderson, Patricia M., and Bruce D. Meyer.  1994.  "The Extent and Consequences of Job 
Turnover." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:  Microeconomics, 177-236. 
 
Aukutsionek, Sergey, Igor Filatochev, and Rostislav Kapeliushnikov.  2000.  "Dynamic Models 
of Labour Demand in Russia: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results."  Draft paper, 
photocopied. 
 
Biletsky, Serhiy, J. David Brown, John S. Earle, Julia Khaleeva, Ivan Komarova, Olga Lazareva, 
and Klara Z. Sabirianova.  2002.  "Inside the Transforming Firm."  Working Paper. 
 
Brown, J. David, and John S. Earle.  2001.   "Privatization, Competition, and Reform Strategies: 
Theory and Evidence from Russian Enterprise Panel Data." Centre for Economic Policy 
Research Discussion Paper No. 2758. London: CEPR. 
 
Brown, J. David, and John S. Earle.  2002.  "Gross Job Flows in Russian Industry Before and 
After Reforms: Has Destruction Become More Creative?"  Journal of Comparative 
Economics 30(1): 96–133. 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  1979.  Employment and Earnings, U.S. Department of Labor. 
 
Burgess, Simon, Julia Lane, and David Stevens.  2000.  "Job Flows, Worker Flows, and 
Churning."  Journal of Labor Economics 18(3): 473-502. 
 
Burgess, Simon, Julia Lane, and David Stevens.  2001.  "Churning Dynamics: An Analysis of 
Hires and Separations at the Employer Level."  Labour Economics 8(1): 1-14. 
 
Clarke, Simon (ed.).  1997.  Structural Adjustment Without Mass Unemployment? Lessons from 
Russia, Cheltenham UK/Northampton MA: Edward Elgar. 
 
Clarke, Simon.  1999.  The Formation of a Labor Market in Russia.  Cheltenham 
UK/Northampton MA: Edward Elgar. 
 
Commander, Simon, John McHale, and Ruslan Yemtsov. 1995. "Russia." In Unemployment, 
Restructuring, and the Labor Market in Eastern Europe and Russia, Simon Commander 
and Fabrizio Coricelli, eds., Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Economic Development 
Institute Development Studies. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
  22
Davis, Steven J., and John C. Haltiwanger.  1992.  "Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction 
and Employment Reallocation." Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3): 819-863. 
 
Davis, Steven J., and John C. Haltiwanger.  1998.  "Measuring Gross Worker and Job Flows."  In 
Labor Statistics Measurement Issues, M. Manser and Robert Topel, eds.  Chicago:   
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Davis, Steven J., and John C. Haltiwanger.  1999.  "Gross Job Flows." In Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds.  Vol. 3B, 2712-2803. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
 
Davis, Steven J., John C. Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh.  1996.  Job Creation and Destruction. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Dunne, Timothy, Mark Roberts, and Larry Samuelson.  1989a.  "The Growth and Failure of U.S. 
Manufacturing Plants."  Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(4): 671-698. 
 
Dunne, Timothy, Mark Roberts, and Larry Samuelson. 1989b.  "Plant Turnover and Gross 
Employment Flows in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector."  Journal of Labor Economics  
7(1): 48-71. 
 
Earle, John S., and Sabirianova, Klara Z.  2002a.  "How Late to Pay?  Understanding Wage 
Arrears in Russia."  Journal of Labor Economics 20(3): 661–707. 
 
Earle, John S., and Sabirianova, Klara Z.  2002b.  Structural Change, Mismatch, and Job 
Mobility:  Evidence from Russia."  Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Gimpelson, Vladimir, and Douglas Lippoldt.  1997.  "Labour Turnover in the Russian Economy." 
In Labour Market Dynamics in the Russian Federation, Douglas Lippoldt, ed.  Paris: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Gimpelson, Vladimir, and Douglas Lippoldt.  2001.  The Russian Labor Market: Between 
Transition and Turmoil.  Lanham, Maryland/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Goskomstat.  2000.  Russian Statistical Yearbook: 2000.  Moscow: Goskomstat of Russia. 
 
Haltiwanger, John, and Milan Vodopivec.  2002.  "Gross Worker and Job Flows in a Transition 
Economy:  An Analysis of Estonia."  Forthcoming, Labour Economics. 
 
Hamermesh, Daniel. S., Wolter H.J. Hassink, and Jan C. van Ours.  1996.  "Job Turnover and 
Labor Turnover: A Taxonomy of Employment Dynamics."  Annales d'Economie et de 
Statistique 41/42: 21–40.  
 
Jurajda, Stepan, and Katherine Terrell.  2000.  "Optimal Speed of Transition: Micro Evidence 
from the Czech Republic."  Unpublished manuscript. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
  23
Kabalina, Veronika.  1998.  "Why Do Russian Enterprises Continue Hiring Despite Cuts in 
Production: Notes on Organization, Institutional and Socio-Structural Factors of Labor 
Mobility in Contemporary Russia."  Paper presented to Economic Sociology Workshop, 
Stanford University. 
 
Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav.  1997a.  "Job and Labour Turnover in the Russian Industry."  Russian 
Economic Barometer 6(1): 31-51. 
 
Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav.  1997b.  "Job Turnover in a Transitional Economy: The Behaviour 
and Expectations of Russian Industrial Enterprises."  In Labour Market Dynamics in the 
Russian Federation, Douglas Lippoldt, ed. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. 
 
Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav.  2001.  The Russian Labor Market:  Adjustment without 
Restructuring.  Moscow: State University, Higher School of Economics. 
 
Konings, Jozef, and Hartmut Lehmann.  2002.  "Marshall and Labor Demand in Russia:  Going 
Back to Basics."  Journal of Comparative Economics 30(1): 134–159. 
 
Konings, Jozef, Harmut Lehmann, and Mark Schaffer.  1996.  "Job Creation and Job Destruction 
in a Transition Economy: Ownership, Firm Size and Gross Job Flows in Polish 
Manufacturing, 1988-91."  Labour Economics 3(3): 299-317. 
 
Kornai, Janos.  1990.  The Road to a Free Econom: Shifting from a Socialist System: The 
Example of Hungary.  New York/London: W.W. Norton. 
 
Layard, Richard, and Andrea Richter.  1994.  "Labour Market Adjustment–The Russian Way."  
Draft of June 8. 
 
Lehmann, Hartmut, Jonathan Wadsworth, and Alessandro Acquisti.  1999.  "Grime and 
Punishment: Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation."  Journal of 
Comparative Economics 27(4): 595-617. 
 
Lehmann, Hartmut, and Jonathan Wadsworth.  2000.  "Tenures that Shook the World:  Worker 
Turnover in Russia, Poland, and Britain."  Journal of Comparative Economics 28(4): 
639–664. 
 
Medoff, James.  1979.  "Layoffs and Alternatives under Trade Unions in U.S. Manufacturing."  
American Economic Review 69(3): 380-395. 
 
Murrell, Peter. 1992.  “Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Reform of the Centrally 
Planned Economies.”  In Emergence of Market Economies in Eastern Europe, Cristopher 
C. Clague and Gordon Rausser, eds.  Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Oi, Walter Y.  1962.  "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor."  Journal of Political Economy 70(6): 538-
55. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
  24
 
Pencavel, John.  1991.  Labor Markets Under Trade Unionism.  Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Sabirianova, Klara.  2002.  "The Great Human Capital Reallocation: A Study of Occupational 
Mobility in Transitional Russia."  Journal of Comparative Economics 30(1): 191–217. 
 
Shakhnovich, Ruvim, and Galina Yudashkina.  2001.  "Wage-Setting and Employment Behavior 
of Enterprises during the Period of Economic Transition."  Working Paper No. 01/04, 
Economics Education and Research Consortium, Moscow. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert.  1994.  "Politicians and Firms."  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 109(4): 995-1025. 
 
Yakubovich, Valery.  2002.  "Patterns of Inaction:  Nonsearch as a Matching Method in the 
Russian Urban Labor Market."  Draft, University of Chicago. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
  25
 
Table 1:  Alternative Measures of Job Flows, 1990-99 
 
 Registry 
Average-
Year 
Creation 
Rate  
 
Registry 
Average-
Year 
Destruc- 
tion Rate  
Survey 
Average-
Year 
Creation 
Rate  
 
Survey 
Average-
Year 
Destruc- 
tion Rate  
End-Year 
Creation 
Rate 
End-Year 
Destruc-
tion Rate 
End-Year 
Creation 
Rate 
(Reorganiz
ation-Free) 
 
End-Year 
Destruc- 
tion Rate 
(Reorganiz
ation-Free)  
End-Year 
Realloca-
tion Rate 
(Reorganiz
ation-Free) 
End-Year 
Net 
Change 
(Reorganiz
ation-Free) 
End-Year 
Excess 
Realloca- 
tion 
(Reorganiz
ation-Free) 
1990 2.24 
(0.12) 
5.35 
(0.24) 
2.85 
(0.52) 
7.58 
(0.82) 
1.97 
(0.54) 
3.66 
(0.91) 
2.04 
(0.56) 
3.63 
(0.86) 
5.68 
(0.93) 
-1.59 
(1.12) 
3.95 
(1.08) 
1991 3.85 
(0.11) 
5.98 
(0.24) 
3.63 
(0.48) 
8.19 
(0.76) 
2.92 
(0.51) 
3.29 
(0.86) 
2.96 
(0.53) 
3.33 
(0.82) 
6.29 
(0.89) 
-0.36 
(1.07) 
5.79 
(1.02) 
1992 2.62 
(0.08) 
7.17 
(0.16) 
3.36 
(0.43) 
7.87 
(0.67) 
2.68 
(0.49) 
8.20 
(0.81) 
2.87 
(0.50) 
8.12 
(0.77) 
10.99 
(0.83) 
-5.24 
(1.00) 
5.02 
(0.97) 
1993 2.10 
(0.09) 
12.45 
(0.21) 
2.77 
(0.42) 
11.96 
(0.66) 
2.97 
(0.47) 
7.84 
(0.78) 
2.79 
(0.48) 
7.85 
(0.74) 
10.65 
(0.80) 
-5.06 
(0.96) 
5.77 
(0.93) 
1994 2.93 
(0.16) 
10.33 
(0.17) 
3.12 
(0.42) 
10.09 
(0.66) 
1.95 
(0.44) 
11.98 
(0.73) 
2.20 
(0.45) 
11.79 
(0.70) 
14.00 
(0.75) 
-9.59 
(0.90) 
3.53 
(0.87) 
1995 3.84 
(0.24) 
9.23 
(0.20) 
2.70 
(0.42) 
10.35 
(0.65) 
2.14 
(0.42) 
9.39 
(0.70) 
2.19 
(0.43) 
9.24 
(0.66) 
11.44 
(0.72) 
-7.05 
(0.86) 
3.94 
(0.83) 
1996 1.61 
(0.12) 
14.41 
(0.40) 
1.56 
(0.42) 
13.72 
(0.66) 
1.84 
(0.41) 
11.70 
(0.69) 
1.77 
(0.42) 
11.32 
(0.65) 
13.09 
(0.70) 
-9.54 
(0.84) 
3.33 
(0.82) 
1997 2.19 
(0.13) 
10.90 
(0.28) 
2.67 
(0.43) 
11.02 
(0.67) 
2.50 
(0.40) 
11.34 
(0.66) 
2.83 
(0.41) 
11.14 
(0.63) 
13.97 
(0.68) 
-8.30 
(0.82) 
4.81 
(0.79) 
1998 2.87 
(0.17) 
9.95 
(0.39) 
4.57 
(0.46) 
8.12 
(0.71) 
1.94 
(0.39) 
11.65 
(0.65) 
2.02 
(0.40) 
10.76 
(0.62) 
12.79 
(0.67) 
-8.74 
(0.80) 
3.82 
(0.78) 
1999 3.58 
(0.19) 
8.03 
(0.13) 
4.62 
(0.52) 
10.64 
(0.82) 
5.13 
(0.74) 
5.98 
(1.23) 
5.06 
(0.76) 
5.94 
(1.17) 
11.00 
(1.26) 
-0.88 
(1.52) 
9.80 
(1.46) 
Pooled 2.72 
(0.02) 
9.57 
(0.00) 
3.11 
(0.14) 
10.10 
(0.22) 
2.42 
(0.14) 
9.22 
(0.24) 
2.51 
(0.15) 
8.98 
(0.23) 
11.48 
(0.25) 
-6.80 
(0.30) 
4.61 
(0.29) 
These are coefficients on the respective year dummies from regressions also containing firm fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The average year rates are for the rates across year t and t+1.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Table 2: Worker Flows, 1990-99 
 
 Goskomstat 
Accession 
Rate 
Goskomstat 
Separation 
Rate 
Survey 
Accession 
Rate 
Survey 
Separation 
Rate 
Accession 
Rate 
(Reorganiza
tion-Free) 
Separation 
Rate 
(Reorganiza
tion-Free) 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
(Reorgani
zation-
Free) 
Churning 
Rate 
(Reorgani
zation-
Free) 
Churning 
Flows/ 
Worker 
Flows 
(Reorganizat
ion-Free) 
1990     20.93 
(0.96) 
22.62 
(1.03) 
21.03 
(0.97) 
22.62 
(1.00) 
43.65 
(1.61) 
37.97 
(1.44) 
82.41 
(1.49) 
1991     21.34 
(0.91) 
21.72 
(0.97) 
21.28 
(0.92) 
21.64 
(0.95) 
42.93 
(1.54) 
36.64 
(1.38) 
80.25 
(1.43) 
1992 22.9  26.9  21.05 
(0.86) 
26.57 
(0.92) 
21.10 
(0.87) 
26.35 
(0.90) 
47.45 
(1.45) 
36.46 
(1.29) 
70.20 
(1.34) 
1993 20.1  28.8  21.88 
(0.82) 
26.75 
(0.88) 
21.58 
(0.83) 
26.64 
(0.85) 
48.22 
(1.38) 
37.58 
(1.23) 
72.52 
(1.28) 
1994 18.2  32.0  19.25 
(0.77) 
29.28 
(0.82) 
19.24 
(0.78) 
28.84 
(0.81) 
48.08 
(1.31) 
34.08 
(1.16) 
64.46 
(1.21) 
1995 21.1  28.4  20.57 
(0.74) 
27.83 
(0.79) 
20.75 
(0.75) 
27.80 
(0.77) 
48.55 
(1.24) 
37.11 
(1.11) 
69.91 
(1.15) 
1996 16.9  27.0  17.57 
(0.72) 
27.43 
(0.77) 
17.45 
(0.73) 
26.99 
(0.75) 
44.44 
(1.22) 
31.35 
(1.09) 
64.80 
(1.12) 
1997 19.2  26.8  19.82 
(0.70) 
28.66 
(0.75) 
20.11 
(0.71) 
28.41 
(0.73) 
48.52 
(1.18) 
34.55 
(1.05) 
66.95 
(1.09) 
1998 19.8  27.7  19.75 
(0.69) 
29.46 
(0.74) 
19.80 
(0.70) 
28.54 
(0.72) 
48.34 
(1.16) 
35.56 
(1.03) 
69.31 
(1.07) 
1999 27.4  27.0  25.77 
(1.30) 
26.61 
(1.39) 
25.65 
(1.31) 
26.53 
(1.35) 
52.17 
(2.19) 
41.18 
(1.95) 
75.26 
(2.02) 
Pooled     20.35 
(0.25) 
27.15 
(0.27) 
20.37 
(0.25) 
26.84 
(0.26) 
47.21 
(0.42) 
35.73 
(0.38) 
70.46 
(0.40) 
    The time period is from the beginning to end of the year. These are coefficients on the respective year dummies from regressions      
    also containing firm fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Table 3: Accession and Separation Breakdown 
 
 Accession 
Rate 
Rehiring 
Rate  
Rehires/ 
Accessions 
Separation 
Rate 
Quit Rate  Quits/ 
Separations 
Layoff 
Rate 
Layoff/ 
Separations 
1990 20.64 
(0.92) 
1.10 
(0.40) 
6.04 
(0.94) 
22.32 
(0.94) 
13.02 
(0.70) 
60.64 
(1.29) 
0.33 
(0.42) 
3.87 
(1.38) 
1991 20.60 
(0.89) 
1.05 
(0.39) 
5.95 
(0.92) 
21.47 
(0.91) 
12.55 
(0.67) 
61.11 
(1.23) 
0.66 
(0.40) 
5.62 
(1.27) 
1992 20.91 
(0.86) 
1.19 
(0.37) 
6.82 
(0.89) 
26.57 
(0.88) 
16.50 
(0.64) 
64.40 
(1.19) 
1.13 
(0.38) 
6.63 
(1.18) 
1993 20.89 
(0.81) 
1.10 
(0.36) 
5.81 
(0.85) 
26.51 
(0.84) 
17.88 
(0.61) 
66.77 
(1.13) 
1.25 
(0.37) 
6.69 
(1.06) 
1994 18.58 
(0.75) 
1.25 
(0.32) 
7.01 
(0.76) 
28.57 
(0.77) 
19.05 
(0.56) 
67.12 
(1.04) 
2.05 
(0.34) 
9.10 
(0.94) 
1995 20.38 
(0.71) 
1.51 
(0.30) 
8.64 
(0.70) 
27.25 
(0.73) 
18.36 
(0.54) 
66.40 
(0.99) 
2.50 
(0.32) 
10.62 
(0.82) 
1996 17.05 
(0.70) 
1.13 
(0.29) 
8.50 
(0.69) 
27.22 
(0.72) 
17.84 
(0.53) 
65.00 
(0.98) 
3.07 
(0.32) 
13.37 
(0.81) 
1997 19.11 
(0.68) 
1.87 
(0.28) 
7.96 
(0.66) 
27.22 
(0.70) 
17.17 
(0.51) 
64.39 
(0.93) 
3.90 
(0.30) 
14.71 
(0.77) 
1998 19.08 
(0.67) 
1.22 
(0.27) 
9.10 
(0.63) 
28.15 
(0.69) 
18.58 
(0.50) 
67.18 
(0.92) 
3.57 
(0.30) 
12.75 
(0.75) 
1999 25.77 
(1.28) 
1.71 
(0.48) 
10.47 
(1.19) 
25.99 
(1.31) 
19.44 
(0.98) 
67.52 
(1.87) 
1.27 
(0.58) 
11.09 
(1.53) 
Pooled 19.81 
(0.24) 
1.33 
(0.10) 
7.79 
(0.24) 
26.51 
(0.25) 
17.26 
(0.19) 
65.23 
(0.34) 
2.27 
(0.11) 
10.64 
(0.30) 
                    The time period is from the beginning to end of the year. These are coefficients on the respective year dummies   
                    from  regressions  also  containing  firm fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Firms undergoing a  
                    reorganization in the particular year are not included. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
  28
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Year-by-Year Employment Growth Rates 
 
  5%  10%  25% 50% 75% 90% 95% Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
1990  -12.6 -8.5 -5.0 -1.7 0.7 4.1 7.2 -2.5  10.0 
1991 -13.8  -10.7  -6.4 -1.4 2.0 6.2 9.7 -1.4  9.5 
1992  -30.8 -25.6 -11.9 -4.4 2.4 8.2 14.5 -5.9  13.9 
1993  -29.2 -20.5 -12.7 -4.0 1.3 7.1 11.6 -5.6  15.4 
1994  -34.0 -28.8 -18.7 -8.0 0.0 4.7 12.3 -9.6  16.2 
1995  -32.5 -23.4 -14.9 -5.0 1.3 6.4 11.0 -7.2  14.8 
1996  -37.2 -29.1 -17.9 -6.6 0.0 6.0 10.7 -9.5  15.5 
1997  -42.5 -29.6 -14.8 -5.4 0.0 8.1 14.1 -7.8  23.8 
1998  -40.8 -29.0 -15.2 -5.2 0.6 7.2 12.8 -8.1  19.4 
1999 -21.9  -16.9  -4.1 0.0 10.0 20.0 27.0 1.6  21.2 
Average  -32.9 -25.1 -13.1 -4.0 1.1 7.2 12.9 -6.5  17.2 
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Table 5: Job and Worker Flow Heterogeneity 
 
 Creation 
Rate  
 
Destruc- 
tion Rate  
Realloca-
tion Rate 
Net 
Change 
Accession 
Rate 
Separation 
Rate 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning 
Rate 
Churning 
Flows/ 
Worker 
Flows 
1990 3.74  9.77  9.58  11.27  9.70 13.52  20.66  18.23  16.73 
1991 5.44  7.58  8.49  10.11  9.87  9.59  16.63  15.55  15.73 
1992 5.32  9.80  9.97  12.21  9.66 10.57  16.15  15.27  19.17 
1993 7.14  8.97  10.57  12.30  10.96 10.79  17.94  16.25  16.31 
1994 6.09  9.91  10.17  12.94  10.32 10.97  16.93  16.12  17.53 
1995 4.90  9.76  9.84  11.90  10.13 10.55  16.92  15.70  18.42 
1996 4.58  11.15  10.81  13.18  8.77 12.02  16.40  14.57  18.96 
1997 9.91  11.66  14.09  16.42  14.98 13.03  22.78  17.82  19.34 
1998 8.03  13.39  14.43  16.72  12.62 14.31  21.17  19.18  20.19 
1999 10.97  11.17  12.83  18.04  22.40  18.12 36.54  32.95 18.86 
Pooled 6.93 10.95  11.71 14.10 12.03  12.46  20.03 17.89 19.11 
            The time period is from the beginning to end of the year. These are the standard deviations of the residuals from the    
            reorganization-free end-year rate regressions in Table 1. 
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Table 6:  Firm Characteristics 
 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Conditional 
Mean 
Private Share  0.561  0.454  0.881 
Insider Share  0.370  0.378  0.613 
Worker Share  0.262  0.309  0.475 
Manager Share  0.090  0.174  0.165 
Outsider Share  0.189  0.281  0.432 
Dispersed Outsider Share  0.056  0.126  0.186 
Domestic Blockholder Share  0.119  0.236  0.378 
Foreign Blockholder Share  0.013  0.077  0.222 
Union Membership  0.837  0.276  0.877 
Product Market Concentration  0.303  0.184   
Labor Market Concentration  0.338  0.348   
New Firm (dummy)  0.035     
Reorganized Firm (dummy)  0.266     
Adjustment Cost*  68.10  82.00   
*This variable is not logged here, but it is in the regressions. 
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Table 7: Old vs. New Job and Worker Flows 
 
 Creation 
Rate  
 
Destruc- 
tion Rate  
Realloca-
tion Rate 
Net 
Change 
Excess 
Realloca- 
tion 
Accession 
Rate 
Separation 
Rate 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning 
Rate 
Churning 
Flows/ 
Worker 
Flows 
Old 2.01 
(0.19) 
8.90 
(0.42) 
10.91 
(0.42) 
-6.89 
(0.51) 
4.01 
(0.39) 
18.45 
(0.88) 
25.34 
(0.89) 
43.80 
(1.69) 
32.89 
(1.62) 
69.90 
(1.31) 
Reorganized 2.70 
(0.40) 
9.67 
(0.82) 
12.37 
(0.88) 
-6.97 
(0.94) 
5.40 
(0.80) 
24.02*** 
(1.73) 
30.99*** 
(1.69) 
55.00*** 
(3.29) 
42.63*** 
(3.18) 
74.01* 
(1.85) 
New 11.51*** 
(2.61) 
4.26*** 
(0.92) 
15.77* 
(2.78) 
7.25*** 
(2.74) 
8.53 
(1.84) 
33.88*** 
(5.66) 
26.63 
(4.69) 
60.51* 
(10.02) 
44.73 
(8.95) 
57.77 
(8.17) 
*, **, and *** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significantly different from old firms at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Percentage of Total of Job and Worker Flows by Firm Age Categories 
 
 Creation   
 
Destruction Reallocation Accessions Separations Worker Flows  Employment Share 
Old 45.8  64.6  60.0  56.1  60.0  58.3  64.1 
Reorganized 28.4  32.4  31.4  33.7  33.8  33.8  29.6 
New 25.9  3.1  8.6  10.2  6.2  8.0  6.3 
The flow percentages are based on the coefficients from the regressions in Table 7 and the employment shares in the last 
column of this table. The employment shares are the percentages of firms in the survey in these age categories.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Table 9: Adjustment Cost Regressions 
 
Average 
Employment 
0.137 
(3.20) 
    
Capital Intensity    0.127 
(2.57) 
  
Average Wage      0.063 
(0.80) 
 
Labor Productivity        0.071 
(1.22) 
University 1.619 
(2.06) 
0.727 
(0.95) 
1.357 
(1.84) 
1.327 
(1.79) 
Special Technical  0.783 
(1.01) 
0.857 
(1.21) 
0.997 
(1.47) 
1.109 
(1.65) 
Professional 
Technical 
0.323 
(0.45) 
0.662 
(1.05) 
0.725 
(1.16) 
0.770 
(1.25) 
Secondary 0.263 
(0.37) 
0.080 
(0.12) 
0.334 
(0.52) 
0.365 
(0.58) 
Electricity 0.437 
(1.34) 
0.456 
(1.43) 
0.592 
(1.99) 
0.525 
(1.60) 
Fuel 0.444 
(1.15) 
0.678 
(1.56) 
0.857 
(1.93) 
0.800 
(1.77) 
Ferrous Metallurgy  0.328 
(0.68) 
0.420 
(0.99) 
0.552 
(1.31) 
0.536 
(1.29) 
Non-Ferrous 
Metallurgy 
0.865 
(2.75) 
0.712 
(1.65) 
0.862 
(2.57) 
0.883 
(2.65) 
Chemical 0.179 
(0.52) 
0.359 
(1.10) 
0.509 
(1.66) 
0.519 
(1.70) 
Machine-Building 0.408 
(1.44) 
0.618 
(2.27) 
0.726 
(2.81) 
0.738 
(2.86) 
Pulp and Paper  -0.110 
(-0.35) 
0.126 
(0.44) 
0.194 
(0.67) 
0.294 
(1.00) 
Construction 
Materials 
-0.564 
(-1.71) 
-0.822 
(-2.35) 
-0.707 
(-2.13) 
-0.722 
(-2.15) 
Light Industry  0.616 
(2.05) 
0.745 
(2.60) 
0.765 
(2.79) 
0.802 
(2.90) 
Food Processing  -0.187 
(-0.61) 
-0.239 
(-0.80) 
-0.181 
(-0.63) 
-0.221 
(-0.74) 
Adjusted R
2  .200 .212 .206  .207 
N  309 310 339  339 
These are OLS regressions for 1998, where adjustment costs is the dependent variable.  
Less than secondary is the omitted education category, and other industries is the 
omitted industry category.  T statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 10: Determinants of Job and Worker Flows 
 
 Job 
Reallocation 
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning Rate 
Private Share  0.007 
(0.56) 
-0.008 0.025 
(1.11) 
0.018 
(0.85) 
Union -0.010 
(-0.43) 
-0.018 -0.194 
(-4.65) 
-0.184 
(-4.71) 
Product Concentration  0.072 
(2.57) 
0.001 0.015 
(0.30) 
-0.058 
(-1.25) 
Labor Concentration  0.052 
(1.09) 
-0.004 0.045 
(0.54) 
-0.007 
(-0.09) 
R
2 .022    .033  .032 
N 2174    2174  2174 
These are coefficients from regressions also containing firm fixed effects and year 
dummies.  T statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Insider and Outsider Ownership 
 
 Job 
Reallocation 
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning Rate 
Insider Share  0.022 
(1.53) 
-0.001 0.071 
(2.76) 
0.049 
(2.01) 
Outsider Share  -0.024 
(-1.17) 
-0.022 -0.056 
(-1.57) 
-0.032 
(-0.96) 
R
2 .029    .041  .036 
N 2162    2162  2162 
These are coefficients from regressions also containing the other variables in Table 10 
(except private share).  T statistics are in parentheses.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Table 12: Disaggregated Private Ownership 
 
 Job 
Reallocation 
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
Worker Flow 
Rate 
Churning Rate 
Worker Share  0.016 
(0.85) 
-0.024 0.032 
(0.98) 
0.016 
(0.52) 
Manager Share  0.052 
(1.39) 
0.076 0.162 
(2.52) 
0.110 
(1.82) 
Dispersed Outsider 
Share 
-0.031 
(-0.80) 
-0.052 0.125 
(1.88) 
0.156 
(2.49) 
Domestic 
Blockholder Share 
-0.028 
(-1.07) 
0.003 -0.101 
(-2.28) 
-0.073 
(-1.76) 
Foreign Blockholder 
Share 
-0.055 
(-0.55) 
-0.209 -0.413 
(-2.43) 
-0.359 
(-2.24) 
R
2 .030    .049  .038 
N 2011    2011  2011 
These are coefficients from regressions also containing the other variables in Table 10 
(except Private Share).  T statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Job and Worker Flows by Firm Age and Adjustment Cost 
 
 Job 
Reallocation 
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning Rate 
New -0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.030 0.133 
(0.93) 
0.134 
(1.15) 
Reorganized 0.013 
(1.26) 
0.012 0.069 
(2.01) 
0.056 
(1.64) 
Adjustment Cost  0.010 
(2.43) 
0.005 -0.011 
(-0.60) 
-0.021 
(-1.23) 
R
2 .077    .129  .131 
N 1890    1890  1890 
These are coefficients from OLS regressions also containing all other variables from 
Table 10 above and 10 industrial sector dummies.  T statistics, corrected for firm 
clustering, are in parentheses. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Table 14: Job and Worker Flow Sensitivity to Adjustment Cost over Time 
 
 Job 
Reallocation 
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning Rate 
Adjust*Time 0.000 
(0.01) 
0.053 -0.002 
(-1.30) 
-0.003 
(-1.41) 
These are coefficients from regressions also containing firm fixed effects and year 
dummies.  T statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Interactions with Adjustment Costs 
 
 Job 
Reallocation 
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning 
Rate 
Private Share  0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.009 0.107 
(1.61) 
0.105 
(1.66) 
Private Share*Adjust  0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.015 -0.022 
(-1.32) 
-0.022 
(-1.41) 
Union -0.025 
(-0.32) 
-0.024 -0.033 
(-0.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.06) 
Union*Adjust 0.006 
(0.26) 
-0.009 -0.046 
(-1.16) 
-0.052 
(-1.37) 
Product Concentration  -0.078 
(-0.66) 
0.001 -0.094 
(-0.44) 
-0.017 
(-0.08) 
Prod. Conc.*Adjust  0.035 
(1.16) 
0.005 0.021 
(0.39) 
-0.014 
(-0.26) 
Labor Concentration  0.107 
(0.46) 
0.002 0.436 
(1.02) 
0.328 
(0.81) 
Labor Conc.*Adjust  -0.013 
(-0.21) 
0.029 -0.110 
(-0.92) 
-0.096 
(-0.85) 
R
2 .023    .036  .039 
N 1909    1909  1909 
T statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 16: Job and Worker Flows and Interactions with Adjust Costs  
(Insider and Outsider Ownership) 
 
 Job 
Reallocation 
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning 
Rate 
Insider Share  0.024 
(0.49) 
-0.004 0.399 
(4.51) 
0.375 
(4.45) 
Insider Share*Adjust  -0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.007 -0.087 
(-3.86) 
-0.085 
(-3.99) 
Outsider Share  -0.053 
(-0.68) 
-0.015 -0.539 
(-3.78) 
-0.486 
(-3.57) 
Outsider Share*Adjust  0.008 
(0.38) 
-0.028 0.123 
(3.39) 
0.115 
(3.35) 
R
2 .027    .042  .044 
N 1903    1903  1903 
These are coefficients from regressions also containing all other variables in the 
regressions in Table 15.  T statistics are in parentheses. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 490 
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Table 17: Job and Worker Flows and Interactions with Adjust Costs 
(Disaggregated Ownership) 
 
 Job 
Reallocation
Excess Job 
Reallocation
Worker 
Flow Rate 
Churning 
Rate 
Worker Share  0.033 
(0.44) 
-0.026 0.275 
(2.08) 
0.241 
(1.92) 
Worker*Adjust -0.007 
(-0.37) 
-0.004 -0.068 
(-2.07) 
-0.061 
(-1.96) 
Manager Share  0.029 
(0.20) 
0.072 0.888 
(3.37) 
0.859 
(3.43) 
Manager*Adjust 0.010 
(0.25) 
-0.013 -0.186 
(-2.80) 
-0.195 
(-3.10) 
Dispersed Outsider  -0.296 
(-1.80) 
-0.059 0.558 
(1.92) 
0.854 
(3.10) 
Dispersed*Adjust 0.074 
(1.81) 
-0.012 -0.106 
(-1.47) 
-0.180 
(-2.63) 
Domestic Blockholder  0.060 
(0.55) 
-0.001 -1.198 
(-6.25) 
-1.258 
(-6.90) 
Domestic 
Blockholder*Adjust 
-0.024 
(-0.86) 
-0.027 0.291 
(5.90) 
0.315 
(6.72) 
Foreign Blockholder  -0.345 
(-0.56) 
-0.567 -3.150 
(-2.92) 
-2.806 
(-2.73) 
Foreign 
Blockholder*Adjust 
0.061 
(0.46) 
0.323 0.543 
(2.32) 
0.482 
(2.17) 
R
2  .031  .037  .030 
N 1787    1787  1787 
    These are coefficients from regressions also containing all other variables in the     
   regressions in Table 15. T statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Table 18: Job and Worker Flows and Interactions with Adjust Costs by Firm Age 
 
 Job 
Reallocation 
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
Worker Flow 
Rate 
Churning Rate
New Firm  -0.039 
(-0.54) 
0.032 0.013 
(0.05) 
0.052 
(0.21) 
New*Adjust 0.011 
(0.51) 
0.020 0.038 
(0.39) 
0.027 
(0.32) 
Reorganized Firm  -0.005 
(-0.15) 
0.012 0.301 
(1.79) 
0.306 
(1.86) 
Reorganized* 
Adjust 
0.005 
(0.52) 
0.002 -0.063 
(-1.56) 
-0.068 
(-1.71) 
Adjusted R
2 .080    .151  .152 
N 1890    1890  1890 
These are coefficients from OLS regressions also containing the variables in Table 15.  T 
statistics, correcting for firm clustering, are in parentheses.  
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